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Introduction
As the importance of the media in our daily lives increases, so does the
need for a democratic media. During the past few decades, however,
the media have been dominated by governments and economic forces: the
imperatives of state and commerce have served as filters which directed
media policies in modern nations. Indeed, debates about the media have
been led by politicians and media barons with the audiences sidelined. In
short, the current media environment seems to exist to serve the interests of
media organizations and governments, not of citizens. Thus, growing
concerns about the infringed public sphere have naturally aroused dis-
enchantment with the established media, which in turn led the audiences
to demand more opportunities for participation in the realization of a
democratic media. To secure a more active role in media arenas, citizens
have set up media watchdog bodies, campaigning for media reform
including better broadcasting. Currently, it is not difficult to witness the
growth of citizens’ groups that are involved in media reform.
Though the media environment is different from country to country,
there seems to be a general consensus that present-day commercialized
media have placed audiences on the defensive as their voices have been
neglected. Indeed, it is unlikely that current audience movements in the
world can have more than a symbolic and marginal impact on the changing
media environment. Yet, considering that we are still at the beginning of
audience sovereignty movements in any meaningful sense, it is unclear
what impacts and influences audience groups will exercise on the media.
More importantly, despite the unpredictable future of media watchdog
bodies, recent decades have witnessed emerging movements of organized
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audiences who voice their opinions about the media, and in turn exercise
their collective power on the media.
These civil efforts to promote democratic, audience-friendly, quality
press and broadcasting can be commonly found in the world. However,
though there has been a considerable increase in people’s awareness about
the influence and importance of the media, it leaves much to be desired
for the promotion of audience-oriented media. This is because citizens’
organizations are poorly financed and organized on the one hand, and
governments and media owners have successfully bypassed the demand of
media watchdog groups, on the other. These business filters and political
constraints have long been in place within the Korean mass media.
Fortunately however, a close examination of broadcasting audience
movements since the early 1980s reveals dynamic developments of, and
future potentials for, media reform. While citizens’ efforts to reform the
broadcasting environment in Korea are still in their infancy, their impact
on Korean broadcasting cannot be underestimated. This article attempts
to address the ways in which television audiences in Korea staged a
collective, nationwide campaign for a television reception fee boycott in
the 1980s and its influence on ongoing media reform campaigns. It also
deals with the broadcasting audience movements in the 1990s by examin-
ing the campaign for a collective boycott of television watching, diversified
tactics and strategies for media reform, and demands for the institutional
reform of broadcasting.
Methodology
Formal interviews were used to see the ways in which main actors of the
broadcast media appraise the impact of the audience movements over the
past two decades. Interviews were conducted through letters with rep-
resentative bodies of listeners and viewers, broadcast producers of the
Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), and Hae-rang Chang, president of the
Korean Broadcast Producers’ Association (KBPA). Interview question-
naires were distributed in June 1998, and retrieved between June and July.
My decision to interview both broadcast producers and audience groups
stems from the assumption that there might exist important differences in
the understanding of broadcasting audience movements between senders
and receivers. This effort proved to be worthwhile in that on some issues
they provided contrasting opinions. A number of broadcasting-related
issues were dealt with in the interviews including the evaluation of broad-
casting audience movements, financial assistance by the government, and
the creation of citizen-owned broadcasting.
For my research, I sent questionnaires to 20 audience representative
bodies which play an active part in media watches, and to 100 KBS
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producers. From them, I was able to gather 8 and 68 responses respect-
ively. The interviews deserve some credit in that even the small, limited
sample was valuable in figuring out differences in the ways in which
broadcast producers and media watchdog bodies understand pending issues
of broadcasting.
Korean broadcasting in the early 1980s
A brief explanation of the Korean media in the early 1980s is needed to
better understand the political context of audience movements in Korea. In
particular, it provides some background for the emergence of the television
reception fee boycott movement in the 1980s, an unprecedented collective
campaign. As is commonly seen in developing countries, political upheaval
exerts a great impact on the media. Eighteen years of dictatorship by
President Park Chung-Hee finally came to an end when he was assassinated
on 26 October 1979. This incident marked a turning point in the media
circle in that media policy drastically changed thereafter. The vacuum of
power was filled by an army general, Chun Doo-Hwan, who staged a coup
d’e´tat. Even before he was officially inaugurated as President, General
Chun placed the media under centralized state control. As the new
government lacked popular support, it never tried to conceal its explicit
intention of placing the media under its control. As a result, the Korean
media experienced major changes in 1980 to their structure, ownership,
regulatory regimes and journalistic practices. The radical overhaul of the
structures of the Korean media can be summarized as follows.
First, considering that the best way to control the media is through the
revision of media-related laws and regulations, the government enacted the
Basic Press Law which comprised all existing media laws. The government
argued that the law was introduced to place ‘greater emphasis on defining
the responsibility rather than on the freedom of the press’ (Kim et al.,
1994: 186). However, the law had been heavily criticized for facilitating
the government’s control over the media and journalists until it was
abolished in 1987. Second, the government established the Korean Broad-
casting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO) to control the television
advertising market. As broadcasting stations were prohibited from airing
any commercials on their own, they had to entrust their advertising to the
Corporation, which charged a commission of 15–20 percent on every
television advertisement. Third, the government had brought the broadcast
media under its control by coercively integrating commercial stations into
the public service. Using such language as the responsibility and account-
ability of broadcasting, the government integrated four commercial radio
stations and TBC-TV (Tongyang Broadcasting Company) into the KBS. In
addition, the KBS obtained 65 percent of MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting
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Corporation) shares. Indeed, all of the nation’s broadcasting systems were
amalgamated under the control of the KBS. With this integration of
broadcasting stations, Korean broadcasting entered the era of public service
with two major public broadcasters (KBS and MBC) and minor religious
radio stations. Fourth, journalists were sacked for being critical of the
government by media barons who were in no position to neglect govern-
ment orders and pressures. The Ministry of Culture and Information
secretly ordered press owners and presidents of public broadcasters to
dismiss journalists who refused censorship. By carrying out a massive
dismissal of journalists, the government intended to tame insubordinate
journalists. As the result of the coercive policy of the government, 305
journalists had to leave their work. In the case of broadcasting, KBS and
MBC sacked 135 and 111 employees respectively. Finally, the government
regulated the inflow of foreign news by integrating news agencies into the
Yonhap News Agency. As a result, citizens were not able to hear and read
foreign news which was detrimental to the government.
Along with above-mentioned coercive measures, the government used a
‘carrot’ policy by proposing economic benefits to media organizations and
journalists. By building barriers to the entry of large companies into the
media market, the government guaranteed stable growth of established
media institutions. Tax benefits were also given to media lords and
journalists: the government lowered the tariff from 20 percent to 4 percent
as a favour to newspaper owners who imported high-speed rotary press
machines; and journalists were given an exemption from taxation on 20
percent of their income (Joo et al., 1997: 187–8). Furthermore, KOBACO
raised the so-called ‘public fund’, part of which was used to offer special
favours to media organizations and journalists (Joo et al., 1997: 193–4).
With the integration of commercial broadcasting stations into the KBS in
1980, the KBS, until then financed only by reception fees from the viewers,
was allowed to broadcast paid adverts which later became a major source
of income. Public discontent with the dual financing system of the KBS
contributed to the rise of a collective campaign for the boycott of the
television reception fee in the mid-1980s. This campaign will be dealt with
in more detail later. More importantly, many prominent journalists joined
active politics at the request of the ruling party. With the inauguration of
the Fifth Republic, 23 journalists gave up influential careers to enter the
Democratic Justice Party (Lee, 1989: 190). Thus, the government’s control
over the media had a great impact both on the actual work of journalists
and on media owners.
The monopoly of the media market and the collusion between the
government and media owners have contributed to the growing alienation
of the audiences, and later to the rise of the public outcry for more freedom
of the press and democratic broadcasting. So, throughout the early 1980s,
there persisted increasing concerns and worries that the media, including
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the KBS, were reflecting the interests of the government and businesses
rather than that of the audiences. It would be no exaggeration to describe
this state of affairs as a crisis of civic communication. However, on the
other hand, it was increasingly clear that formidable pressures were
building up from listeners and viewers to push broadcasting towards the
democratic principles of fairness, objectivity and impartiality. The dis-
illusionment of the audience, coupled with the unhealthy media environ-
ment, finally led to the massive collective movement of television reception
fee boycotts in the mid-1980s.
The KBS-TV reception fee boycott movement
As the demand for democracy grew, so did the importance of the media for
facilitating the process of societal democratization. Accordingly, demo-
cratic forces in society came to realize that societal democratization could
be achieved through the democratization of the media. In other words, it
was understood that democratization of the media could contribute to social
change. Thus, understanding that broadcasting is a major terrain of struggle
over democratization of society in general, citizens’ groups began to
establish media watchdog organs under their umbrella.
Following the tremendous shifts in the media environment in the early
1980s, the Korean media came under the control of the government. Thus,
it came as no surprise that the media in the early 1980s were widely
discredited by their audiences. The audience’s mistrust of the media is
well reflected in a 1993 survey of freedom of the press, which found
that respondents gave the Fifth Republic (1981–7) the lowest mark of 30
points out of 100 whereas the Sixth (1988–92) and the Seventh (1993–7)
Republics earned 45 and 69 respectively (Korean Press Institute, 1993: 21).
The subordination of the media to government influence inevitably caused
civil protests against the media in general, and against the public service
broadcaster KBS in particular. Clearly, in the early 1980s there existed
public discontent with the KBS, which neglected to fulfil its commitment
to public service.
In the first couple of years in the 1980s, we can hardly find any
organized broadcasting audience movements. Yet, this period witnessed
growing discontent among television viewers about news bulletins biased
in favour of the unpopular military government. In particular, there existed
a widespread conviction in rural communities that the media had failed to
portray farmers’ economic situation faithfully. Despite farmers’ economic
hardships, the media repeatedly conveyed government propaganda by
telling viewers that the standard of living had improved remarkably. It is
noteworthy that the movement started in a rural area. In 1983, farmers in
Wanju County, Cholla Province, infuriated by the misleading reports,
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voiced strong displeasure with the KBS, and in turn refused to pay the
television reception fee. This incident, though it has been assessed as the
starting point of the movement, was not enough to serve as a catalyst for
an immediate spread of the campaign on a nationwide scale.
Two years later, however, the movement became revitalized. It was the
general election, held on 12 February 1985, that served as a decisive factor
for the explosion of the dormant public discontent. As the election
approached, television news coverage became extremely biased in favour
of the ruling party candidates. Not surprisingly, television stations were put
under pressure to help the ruling party win the election. This became
possible partly because pro-government figures were appointed as heads of
the broadcasters. The tight collusion between politics and broadcasting was
such that the Catholic Farmers’ Association in Wanju issued a statement on
28 April 1985, titled ‘KBS-TV reception fee should be collected only from
the ruling Democratic Justice Party and the government!’ Among 30-odd
statements issued during the three years of the campaign, it is recorded as
the first one (K.T. Kim, 1994: 381). Thus, politically biased news coverage
can be listed as the main cause of the reception fee boycott campaign.
However, closer examination of the causes of the movement reveals that
other aspects have also contributed to its rise.
Together with the problem of fairness in reporting, KBS’s excessive
dependence on advertising for its budget came under attack. As viewers
consistently raised questions about the validity of advertising on public
service television, the KBS suffered an identity crisis – audience groups
asserted that excessive advertising on public television is against the idea
of public service. Accordingly, television viewers sympathized with this
reasoning to provide their support for the collective movement. The lack of
balanced, quality programming was also criticized: viewers blamed the
public service broadcaster’s ruthless pursuit of commercial interests, seeing
it as a dereliction of public service. There also persisted public outcry over
the declining quality of children’s programmes. In addition, viewers in
mountainous areas refused to pay the fee on the grounds that they were not
able to receive a clear picture. Poor reception areas thus provided an
essentially reasonable and fair argument. These dissatisfactions with the
KBS had been lying dormant until they erupted in 1986, when the full-
scale movement started.
Since the Pan-Christian National Movement Headquarters was estab-
lished under the National Council of Churches (NCC) on 20 January 1986,
the movement was placed on the track of progress in a more organized
way. On 14 February, the Headquarters handed out 50,000 adhesive labels
and 10,000 leaflets to people, which said: ‘We Do Not Watch KBS-TV’
(K.T. Kim, 1994: 382). Catholic churches also added force to the Head-
quarters by issuing a similar statement. The Catholic Committee for the
Promotion of Justice and Peace, which was renowned for its outright anti-
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government stance, officially staged a popular campaign for the reception
fee boycott. A year later, on 25 June 1987, Buddhists, who initially had
reservations, finally joined the movement. Thus, all major religious groups
in Korea made a tremendous contribution to the development of the
campaign. Given that, unlike other social organizations, religious groups
had enjoyed relative autonomy from politics, the prompt and active
participation of Christians and Catholics in the movement can be taken for
granted.
Meanwhile, women’s organizations went one step further by arguing that
the reception fee was something that should be abolished rather than
boycotted. On 25 April 1986, the Association of Women’s Organizations
adopted a resolution supporting the cause of the movement, which was
echoed by the Seoul YMCA. These two groups have a significance in that,
even though they took part in the movement later than the religious groups,
they stayed in at the final stage to wrap things up. The other social
groups had left the movement in 1987 to concentrate on the upcoming
presidential election in December. It should also be noted that the
experience of being in an organized movement provided a valuable
opportunity for women to take a leading part in the following viewers’
campaigns in the 1990s.
The movement, which showed no sign of abating, had to face a new
dimension in the second half of 1987. In June 1987, Korea experienced
political turmoil resulting from the nomination of Roh Tae-woo, President
Chun’s classmate at the Korean Military Academy, as presidential candi-
date of the ruling party. College students and citizens as well as dissident
politicians took to the streets, demanding sweeping democratic reforms
including direct presidential elections and revision of the existing constitu-
tion. The political crisis was resolved by Roh’s surprise announcement of
democratic principles on 29 June, which in turn marked a turning point in
the broadcasting audience movement as well as in other social movements
(Kim et al., 1994: 144). This government counter-attack took the steam out
of the popular campaign. Not surprisingly, as civic groups gradually pulled
out of the strategic alliance with audience groups, the movement, which
reached its peak of influence in 1986 and the first half of 1987, followed a
downhill path until it petered out in early 1989.
One cannot successfully see the characteristics of the movement without
a clear understanding of its political context. Scrutiny of the political
implications of the movement would lead us to conclude that, strictly
speaking, the campaign began as political resistance rather than as an
audience movement in the true sense of the word. As the movement
originally aimed to correct biased news reports from the public service
broadcaster, it was pursued as a means of political struggle to facilitate
democratization of the society (D.K. Kim, 1996: 445). In other words, the
boycott of the reception fee was not an ultimate goal of the movement.
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Rather, it was pursued as an efficient surface means to its final aim of
social democratization. Though the movement aimed to attain the demo-
cratization of society through the democratization of broadcasting, it had
dealt a serious blow to the KBS. As the movement gathered popular
support, the KBS came under increasing public criticism. The loss of
credibility as a public service broadcaster was such that Chul Lee, a
member of the National Assembly, denounced the KBS as a ‘public
enemy’ in the National Assembly (Koo, 1992: 43). The public distrust of
the KBS also led to a sharp decline in the morale of KBS employees.
Indeed, as Chang, president of KBPA stated, throughout the 1980s ‘the
independence of broadcasting from governmental intervention was the
greatest aim of journalists and producers’. Low morale had been latent,
but it surfaced in April 1990, when KBS workers collectively challenged
the government decision to appoint Ki-won Suh, president of the pro-
government Seoul Daily, as head of the broadcaster. On 12 April, the
government responded to the resistance by arresting 171 employees who
took part in the demonstration. Protesting against this coercive measure by
the government, the KBS Union staged an unprecedented strike which
included refusal of programme production. On 30 April, the government
answered the strike repressively again by sending riot police into the
broadcaster to arrest all 333 workers who participated in the sit-in.
The most serious impact of the boycott campaign on the KBS was the
drastic fall in television reception fee collection. The collection, which
amounted to 119.6 billion won in 1985, declined to 78 billion won in 1988.
This can be construed to mean that 31 percent of viewers who had
previously paid the fee participated in the movement (Koo, 1992: 42).
Threatened by the collective boycott, the KBS came to depend increasingly
on advertising for its finance. As Table 1 indicates, the reception fee, which
had provided the bigger part of the KBS budget until 1983, yielded its
TABLE 1
KBS reception fee and advertising revenue (unit: billion won)
Year Reception fee (A) Advertising revenue (B) B/A
1981 63.3 39.6 0.63
1982 90.9 63.9 0.70
1983 108.1 100.1 0.93
1984 125.6 136.5 1.14
1985 119.6 136.5 1.14
1986 101.2 148.7 1.47
1987 91.8 169.6 1.85
1988 78.0 215.3 2.76
1989 103.9 262.9 2.53
Source: KBS statistics cited in Koo (1992: 43).
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place to advertising in 1984. Since then, the reversal has accelerated,
especially since 1986, when viewers collectively sympathized with the
cause of the boycott.
The movement has also changed the way in which viewers see the
relationship between broadcasting and themselves. Indeed, the boycott
campaign of the 1980s marked a watershed as far as public consciousness
about broadcasting was concerned. As Ju-on Woo of the Christian Ethics
Movement of Korea observes, one of the legacies of the campaign is ‘the
understanding of possibilities of exerting impacts and influences on
broadcasters through the collective power of the audiences when broad-
casters failed to fulfil democratic responsibilities’. Until the popular
resistance, viewers had existed only in name without any experience of
exercising collective influence on broadcasters. It should also be noted that
the experience of the campaign spawned many audience representative
groups, which have activated broadcasting audience movements in the new
broadcasting environment of the 1990s.
The broadcasting audience movement in the 1990s
The 1990s have witnessed the replacement of class-based radical social
movements by new civil movements, which emphasize such issues as the
environment, economic justice, women and regions. In the arena of
broadcasting, under the logic of deregulation which brought about a new
television station, the Korean broadcast media have come under the
increasing influence of market principles. Thus, by the early 1990s, the
control mechanism of Korean broadcasting had shifted in large part from
the government to the marketplace. Moreover, the tendency towards
privatization of media organizations has also threatened the media’s role of
serving citizens.
The new broadcasting law, enacted in 1990, paved the way for opening a
multi-channel, commercial broadcasting environment. A year later, the
Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), a new commercial broadcaster, began
operation. Moreover, since 1993, cable television has provided viewers
with more than 30 channels. In addition, the government allowed local
private television networks to cover major cities in Korea. This transforma-
tion required media watchdog groups to adapt themselves to a new media
environment. Indeed, we can identify an important difference between the
audience movements of the 1980s, which were directed at shaking off the
shackles of government intervention, and those of the 1990s, whose
priority was oriented towards the independence of broadcasting from
excessive commercialism.
The establishment of SBS, in the ten years after the ban on commercial
broadcasting, allowed the coexistence of private and public broadcasting
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systems. Behind the revival of the coexistent system was the government’s
realization that it can no longer directly control broadcasting. As a matter
of fact, the introduction of the new competitive broadcasting system
resulted from a political calculation. Threatened by the establishment of
broadcasters’ unions in 1988, the government decided to create a com-
mercial broadcaster to make it compete with the established stations
(Eom, 1998).
With the introduction of commercial broadcasting, the Korean broadcast
media had to follow the logic of profit accumulation. This means that
television came under the influence of advertisers and commercial principles.
Existing public broadcasters, KBS and MBC, did not escape the pressures
of audience maximization because they are, in larger part, financed by
advertising. For its finance the KBS depends more on advertising revenue
(61 percent) than on the reception fee (39 percent), which has never been
raised since it was fixed at 2,500 won per month in 1981. In the case of
MBC, advertising revenue provides 98 percent of its finance (S.S. Kim,
1995: 87).
As expected, SBS recorded a remarkable 19.4 percent share of the
television advertising market in the first year of airing in 1992 (Advertising
Information, January 1994). Accordingly, television producers of existing
broadcasters were strongly urged to make programmes that could guarantee
high ratings. A 1998 survey by the Korean Broadcast Producers’ Asso-
ciation shows that 78.1 percent of producers answered that they were under
increasing pressure to raise the rating of their programmes (Chosun Daily,
26 January 1998). Undoubtedly, the pressure on ratings caused con-
troversies concerning the overall decline of programme quality. Under
these circumstances, the role of the broadcast media serving public interest
had to be set aside as a secondary value. Broadcasting under the control of
the capitalist market system would inevitably result in fierce competition
among networks, and accordingly raise public concerns about the role of
broadcasting. The efforts of broadcasters to expand their advertising profits
met resistance from viewers’ groups on the grounds that too many
entertainment programmes had driven quality programmes out of the
schedules. Associations representing television audiences had consistently
voiced worries concerning the low quality of, and commercialism in,
television programmes.
In the spring of 1993, programme rescheduling at MBC touched off a
campaign for ‘No Television Day’, initiated by the Headquarters for
Listeners and Viewers Movement of Seoul YMCA. A popular children’s
programme Po-po-po, which had been loved by children and parents for 12
years, was finally left out of the daily programming. Believing that the
decision was made out of a commercial concern that children have little
buying power, audience organizations bitterly protested to MBC for the
restoration of the programme in daily scheduling. However, this voice was
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unheard, so the Headquarters started to campaign. On 12 April, Seoul
YMCA held a public hearing on children’s programmes, where participants
blamed public broadcasters’ ruthless pursuit of commercial interests as a
dereliction of public service. They also argued that MBC failed to provide
complementary programming schedules by excluding the popular child-
ren’s programme. Five days later, Seoul YMCA held a demonstration in
front of the MBC building in protest against the way MBC treated viewers,
in particular, children. Lacking proper means of publicity, YMCA adopted
various tactics to put pressure on MBC: picketing, distribution of leaflets,
street campaigns and protest calls. On 2 July, members of YMCA and 40
other civil organizations held a street campaign to encourage citizens to
boycott television viewing on 7 July.
According to the Media Service Korea (MSK), a television viewing rate
research institute, ratings on 7 July dropped by 4.7 percent in Seoul
compared to the week before (Chosun Daily, 9 July 1993). This campaign
received positive responses from some liberal scholars. Evaluating the ‘No
Television Day’ campaign, Jun-man Kang, a media critic, stated that ‘it
would be not too much of an exaggeration to say that superb leadership,
accumulated experiences, and action-oriented tactics of Seoul YMCA have
finally produced a landmark victory for citizens’ (1993: 100). In the broad-
cast circle, however, there existed contrasting views about the assessment
of the campaign. Hae-rang Chang, president of the Korean Broadcast
Producers’ Association, had reservations in defining the campaign as a
success. Chang argued that ‘it is not easy to pass a judgement about the
campaign not only because it was short-lived, but because it failed to
gather wide support from citizens’. Even within the circle of media watch-
dog groups, disagreements surfaced. While Ju-on Woo of the Christian
Ethics Movement of Korea assessed the campaign as ‘a landmark event in
broadcasting history, which provided an opportunity for viewers to realize
the malfunctions of broadcasting and to unite for securing better broad-
casting’, Pil-lip Lee of the Catholics’ Alliance for Media Watch gave it a
low mark of 40 out of 100 on the grounds that ‘the campaign was launched
only by the leaders of religious and civic organizations’. In addition,
asserting that the effect of the campaign was overestimated within the
broadcasting circle, Chae-hee Cho of the Bodhi Broadcasting Monitoring
Team suggests a scientific and practical examination of the campaign.
Though there existed controversies over the significance of the 4.7
percent rating decline, there is no denying that the campaign contributed
to the creation of a favourable broadcast environment. First of all, the
children’s programme Po-po-po, which had been broadcast once a week for
six months, finally returned to daily programming. Furthermore, the three
television stations introduced ombudsman programmes in their regular
seasonal programming reshuffle in October 1993. Famous anchors and
presidents of each broadcaster appeared on television to declare ‘the era of
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viewers’ sovereignty’ and to convince viewers that viewer-oriented pro-
grammes would be made. Thus, the campaign served as an opportunity to
confirm the existence of viewers who had been neglected in the new
broadcasting environment. More specifically, the campaign began to reveal
the characteristics of a consumer movement: viewers formed an alliance
to collectively boycott television just as consumers boycott defective
industrial products.
Audience movements of the 1990s claim distinctive features compared
to those of the 1980s. To begin with, both quantitative and qualitative
programme monitoring projects have been started. Currently, about a dozen
groups publish monitoring reports on a regular basis (Broadcasting Com-
mission, 1996: 96). Through the publication of monitoring reports on target
programmes, the audience groups aim to drive low quality programmes out
of programming. For example, the Mass Communication Monitoring Team,
set up in 1984 under the Association of Women’s Organizations, celebrated
the 100th publication of its monitoring report in May 1996. Many other
similar television monitoring teams were established in the late 1980s and
the early 1990s to build up pressure on television stations. Second,
watchdog groups diversified channels of publicity for their activities. Since
the mid-1990s, the groups have actively held public hearings, symposiums,
seminars and conferences to hear people’s concerns about broadcasting-
related issues. For example, the Friendly Women held a public hearing in
1996 to discuss how women are represented in the media. Moreover,
audience groups began to mobilize like-minded scholars and professional
media critics to support the validity of their arguments. The Women’s
Association nominated four media professors as members of a steering
committee when it inaugurated its Media Headquarters in February 1998.
Third, media watchdog bodies encourage television producers by awarding
prizes for quality programmes. For instance, YMCA Korea established the
‘Good Television Programming’ award in 1996 to reward seven pro-
grammes among 50 nominated by broadcasters. Similarly, the Citizens’
Coalition for Economic Justice collected viewers’ opinions to award the
title of ‘Best Programme’ in the same year. Considering that watchdog
bodies have directed efforts towards pinpointing negative aspects of
broadcasting, the introduction of awards for quality programmes can be
construed as broadening the sphere of their activities. Finally, programmes
of media education for citizens have been widely adopted to enhance the
consciousness of audience sovereignty. Between 1985 and 1997, 1200
citizens completed a programme of media education run by YMCA Seoul.
Similarly, the Association for Democratic Media Movement has run a
media education programme since 1991 which 2114 people have taken.
These activities are significant in that citizens with media literacy are
valuable assets for democratic broadcasting.
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Realizing that legal protection is not necessarily translated into practice,
audience representative bodies have begun to direct efforts towards insti-
tutional reform of the existing broadcasting system. In 1993, audience
groups founded the Audience Solidarity Conference for Democratic Broad-
casting. Declaring its position against the participation of conglomerates in
broadcasting, the Conference emphasized the role of public broadcasting in
an era in which the public sphere is becoming infringed by increasing
commercialism in broadcasting. Furthermore, the Conference formed a
strategic alliance in 1994 with broadcasting unions to create the People’s
Convention for Broadcasting Reform. This alliance has some significance
in that journalists and producers added extra force to audience groups
challenging the influence of politics and the market on broadcasting. In
1996, the Convention went further to announce the ‘Broadcasting Audience
Charter’, with ten points: (1) the right to know; (2) the right to participate
in broadcasting; (3) the right to select broadcasting; (4) the right to demand
fair broadcasting; (5) the right of reply; (6) the right not to be discriminated
against; (7) the right to demand protection for the weak; (8) the right to
refuse an unhealthy environment; (9) the right to demand media education;
and (10) duty as sovereign audiences (Broadcasting Commission, 1996: 28).
Debates about alternative broadcasting also appeared. Criticizing the fact
that there was not a single channel for public access when the government
had allowed over 30 cable channels in 1993, the Convention attempted to
create autonomous alternative broadcasting owned solely by listeners and
viewers. Disenchanted with established broadcasting which failed to
represent the socially weak, such as the old, women, farmers and small
companies, the Convention, composed of 47 civic groups with media
watchdog bodies at the forefront, started in 1997 to set up a new broad-
casting company in which citizens actively participated in the programming
and production of programmes. Citizens’ dissatisfactions with broadcasting
were such that even producers of established broadcasters sympathized
with the creation of alternative broadcasting: 69 percent responded positively
to the inauguration of a citizen-owned broadcasting company whereas only
31 percent of respondents refused to endorse the idea. The Executive
Commissioner of the Convention, Hak-cheon Kim, a media professor at
Kunkuk University, stated that ‘broadcasting audience movements are now
entering a new stage. Instead of demanding broadcasting reform from
people who have never been ready to listen to us, we decided to establish
citizens’ broadcasting’ (Hangyere Daily, 17 March 1997). His remark
implies that without the restructuring of ownership, there would be little or
no hope for better, audience-friendly, publicly accountable broadcasting. Of
course, those who are interested in citizens’ broadcasting seem to have
been encouraged by the establishment of the Hangyere Daily in 1988, a
citizen-owned national paper whose editor-in-chief is chosen by employees
through direct elections. Though it remains to be seen whether this new bid
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for an alternative broadcasting will succeed or not, the attempt itself
signifies that the established broadcasters have failed to gather support
from the audiences.
Conclusion
This documentation of the broadcasting audience movements in Korea
since 1980 has demonstrated how government-controlled broadcasting
generated the unprecedented ‘KBS-TV reception fee boycott campaign’ in
the 1980s, and how market principles of profit accumulation have resulted
in the changed television environment and the subsequent transformation of
broadcasting audience movements in the 1990s. The activation of the
broadcasting audience movement in Korea has to be seen in the political
context which brought into being the reception fee boycott campaign as a
means of protest against the military government in the 1980s. In
retrospect, the strategy of pressuring undemocratic broadcasting for the
democratization of society in general seems to have recorded some success
even though the very democratization of broadcasting has not yet been
attained. It is generally accepted that the boycott campaign had con-
siderably raised public awareness about the social responsibility of broad-
casting. Both audience groups (five out of seven) and broadcast producers
(30 out of 31) showed no hesitation in pointing out the fact that audience
movements have contributed to the increased awareness of audience
sovereignty.
With the enactment of a new Broadcasting Act in 1990, which intro-
duced a commercial broadcaster, cable and local television, broadcasting
audience groups had to fight against excessive commercialization of
broadcasting as well as against government intervention in broadcasting.
Thus, as the ‘No Television Day’ campaign of 1993 clearly illustrates,
Korean broadcasting of the 1990s has come under the increasing control
of capital. In response to the growing influence of commercialism on
broadcasting, there arose an awareness of issues such as the status, role
and power of the audience. This altered broadcasting environment and
increased self-awareness of audiences resulted in strategic alliances between
audience representative bodies and broadcast workers for the institutional
reform of broadcasting, and pushed forward the recent bid for the creation
of alternative citizens’ broadcasting.
Of course, media watchdog bodies in Korea have been striving to protect
the audiences from powerful broadcasters controlled by capital and the
government. Yet, it is not easy to assess their accomplishments. Broadcast
producers seem to be reluctant to agree with audience groups in evaluating
the audience movements as a success story. While all but one of the
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audience bodies appraised positively the contribution of the audience
movements as resulting in an improvement of the broadcasting environ-
ment, 57 percent of producers answered that the movement fell short of
their expectations or that there were no accomplishments except for a
symbolic significance. Despite these controversies over the achievements of
the audience movements, there seems to be no denying that contemporary
broadcasting, driven by economic orientations, would further sideline the
audiences. Here lies a raison d’eˆtre for audience representative bodies
which speak for audiences. Indeed, as the survey result shows, 97 percent
of producers showed a willingness to respect the appraisals and suggestions
of broadcasting audience groups if they are thought to be convincing. In
this sense, a more active role for audience groups is expected to mediate
between broadcasters and audiences.
It remains unclear what future path audience groups in Korea will take.
In other words, it is still uncertain how they will fit between broadcasters
and the audiences. The future of the broadcasting audience movement
depends on which direction it takes. Yet, to ensure further contributions to
the democratization of broadcasting, current broadcasting audience move-
ments should address some lingering problems. Two points in particular
need further consideration.
First, shortage of finance is an urgent problem for almost all media
watchdog bodies. From the beginning, groups involved in the audience
movements had difficulties in mobilizing both human and financial resources.
To support their activities, buy monitoring equipment and pay salaries to
regular employees, media watchdog bodies have demanded government
subsidies. Indeed, in 1996, the government responded positively to this
demand by having the Korean Press Centre subsidize 40 million won from
a ‘public fund’ to two audience groups (Broadcasting Commission, 1996:
97). However, financial assistance from the government raised the thorny
question of how audience representative bodies could maintain independ-
ence from political influence when dependent on government finance.
Indeed, a majority of producers responded that they are against the idea of
financial subsidies from the government: 56 percent expressed concerns
that government subsidies would be detrimental to the pureness of an
audience movement, while 44 percent agreed with the idea of financial
assistance. On the other hand, all eight media watchdog bodies welcomed
the idea of governmental support. In brief, audience groups should direct
efforts towards securing a stable source of finance without being placed in
a compromising position.
Second, we face a more fundamental question of representational claims:
what right do audience representative bodies have to speak on behalf of all
audiences? As was pointed out, if the audience movement is continuously
run by middle-class women, mainly housewives under religious influence,
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their legitimacy should be questioned. An absolute majority of producers
(60 out of 68 respondents) pointed out that the current broadcasting
audience movement, dominated by religious groups and women, has a
fundamental representational weakness by sidelining other social forces.
Moreover, listeners and viewers in local areas would not assent to an
audience movement that takes place in Seoul and its vicinity on the
grounds that specific, local interests tend to be neglected. Thus, current
audience groups are challenged to embrace the entire spectrum of audi-
ences including the poor, the old, etc., and to expand their activities to
incorporate local concerns.
Notwithstanding these problems, it is generally agreed that, given the
current subordination of broadcasting to political and economic constraints,
the media watchdog bodies’ role as a pressure group is needed: 98 percent
of producers accepted the necessity of broadcasting watchdog groups for
the realization of democratic broadcasting. In conclusion, the limitations
and possibilities for the broadcasting audience movements in Korea will
provide important insights into the way audience groups mediate between
broadcasters, the government and the marketplace on the one hand, and the
audiences on the other.
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